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Abstract 
 
  The Air Force Global Logistics Support Center (AFGLSC) is responsible for the 
United States Air Force’s supply chain.  One of the AFGLSC’s responsibilities is to 
improve AF supply chain processes.  This thesis investigates the subject of supply chain 
resilience and its potential impact for improving supply chain management.  Through 
literature a supply chain resilience framework and measurement tool was identified for 
potential benefit to Air Force supply chain management.  Air Force weapon systems were 
identified and segmented into two phases of the weapon system life cycle.  This research 
analyzes data collected on supply chain resilience factors, vulnerabilities and capabilities, 
for each individual weapon system to determine if differences exist as weapon systems 
progress through the weapon system life cycle.  The results indicate that the supply chain 
resilience framework and measurement tool provides Air Force leadership with beneficial 
information to improve and assist in the strategic management of their supply chain.   
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SUPPLY CHAIN RESILIENCE:  ASSESSING USAF WEAPON SYSTEM 
LIFE CYCLE 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
 The Air Force supply chain is one of the largest and most complex 
supply chains in the world, involving millions of parts, thousands of 
business and production processes, and hundreds of information 
systems. There are significant opportunities to improve the Air Force 
supply chain in terms of performance and cost that are both effective and 
efficient.  This requires a revolution in thinking and action.  (Air Force 
Global Logistics Support Center, 2008:1) 
 
 The purpose of this paper is to expand the research in the field of supply chain 
resilience, specifically in a United States Air Force (USAF) setting.  First, this chapter 
will begin with a background of logistics and more recently supply chain management in 
the United States military and specifically in the Air Force.  This is followed by problem 
statement definition, research objectives and concludes with the research focus. 
Background 
 Beginning in the 1960’s the commercial sector was lagging behind the military in 
the field of logistics.  This was evident due to the commercial sector bench-marking 
concepts and practices that the military had developed for their operations (Russell, 
2007).  Figure 1 illustrates the US military’s progression from the leader of logistics in 
the 1950s and 1960s until 2003 and beyond where the military is now implementing the 
commercial sector’s best practices by pursuing the concepts, practices, and technologies 
of supply chain management (Russell, 2007). 
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Figure 1: Evolution of Logistics Thought and Practice 
(Adapted from Russell, 2007) 
 
 
The Department of Defense (DoD), in 2003, directed the implementation of 
modern supply chain practices for all DoD components with the release of the DoD 
Supply Chain Material Management Regulation (DoD 4140.1-R, 2003).  This regulation 
mandates the framework and guiding principles for many aspects of supply chain 
management and requires all DoD components to measure total supply chain 
performance (DoD 4140.1-R, 2003; Russell, 2007).  Under this guidance, the USAF 
created the Air Force Global Logistics Support Center (AFGLSC).  Air Force Materiel 
Command (AFMC) provisionally stood up the AFGLSC on 7 May 2007 and officially on 
28 March 2008.  The USAF also has a long history of supply chain management.  Figure 
2 details the progression of the USAF’s supply chain management.  Prior to 1998 the 
focus was limited to each air force base individually.  Then in 2000, the focus shifted 
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from the individual base to each major command.  In 2006, the focus shifted again from 
the major commands to a weapon system focus and finally with the creation of the 
AFGLSC the focus shifted to the USAF enterprise. 
 
 
Figure 2: AFGLSC Evolution (AFGLSC, 2009) 
 
Since the AFGLSC creation in 2007 it is the agency in charge of the USAF’s 
supply chain.  It was designed to be the single face to the warfighter for all supply chain 
issues and improvements.   
 
AFGLSC’s vision: 
 
Recognized and respected as a premier Supply Chain 
Management organization through trusted support, continuous 
innovation and a professional, highly skilled workforce. 
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AFGLSC’s mission statement: 
Execute the Air Force Supply Chain by integrating Enterprise-
wide planning and strategy with Global command and control as 
the Single Focal Point to the Warfighter. 
 
  In a 15 May 2009 briefing presented by Major General Gary T. McCoy, AFGLSC 
Commander, he identified the AFGLSC’s six top focus areas to improve the USAF’s 
supply chain.  The AFGLSC’s six focus areas include:  
1) Optimize support to the warfighter 
2) Exercise enterprise supply chain command and control 
3) Establish single Air Force supply chain owner 
4) Improve Air Force supply chain processes 
5) Pursue and implement enabling technology 
6) Develop professional, highly skilled workforce (AFGLSC, 2009) 
 
Problem Statement 
The list above identified AFGLSC’s fourth top focus area as improving Air Force 
supply chain processes. Imbedded in this focus area is the requirement to define and 
deploy a supply chain risk management program.  Supply chain resilience has been 
identified as a method of enhancing traditional risk management associated with 
commercial supply chains both in recent literature and research.  This leads to the 
problem statement: 
Does recent literature and research provide AFGLSC a method to enhance 
current supply chain risk management with supply chain resilience? 
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Research Objective 
The objective of this research is to provide AFGLSC with a method to improve 
supply chain management, specifically with the processes involved in supply chain risk 
management. 
This research investigates literature and studies on supply chain resilience.  
Supply chain resilience has been a topic of research since the globalization of the supply 
chain and some major unanticipated disruptions, such as the terrorist attacks on the 
United States on 11 September 2001.  This research will focus on the Supply Chain 
Resilience Assessment and Management (SCRAM™) tool (Pettit, 2008).  The 
SCRAM™ tool is used to measure current supply chain vulnerabilities and capabilities, 
provide recommendations for improvements, and provide information to better prepare 
supply chain leadership with managing products, processes, and relationships.   
Research Focus 
 This research focuses on the AFGLSC’s fourth top focus area, to improve Air 
Force supply chain processes.  This research investigates the use of the SCRAM™ tool, 
which was developed by Pettit (2008), in conjunction with the Center for Resilience and 
the Fisher College of Business at The Ohio State University.  The SCRAM™ tool was 
created to measure the vulnerabilities and capabilities within an organization’s supply 
chain and was validated within the commercial sector.  To date, research conducted 
utilizing the SCRAM™ tool to measure vulnerabilities and capabilities of a supply chain 
has not been utilized on a military supply chain.  This indicates the opportunity for the 
following research question to be investigated: 
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Research Question: Is the SCRAM™ tool able to measure supply chain 
vulnerabilities and capabilities within the USAF’s weapon system product life 
cycle and provide useful feedback?  
 
To answer the research question the following investigative questions will be addressed: 
Question 1:  Will the SCRAM™ tool identify an overage of capabilities 
compared to vulnerabilities in selected weapon system at a current 
point in time in the weapon system life cycle? 
 
Question 2:  Will the SCRAM™ tool identify an underage of capabilities 
compared to vulnerabilities in selected weapon system at a current 
point in time in the weapon system life cycle? 
 
Question 3:  Do supply chain vulnerabilities and capabilities vary across the 
separate weapon system life cycle phases?  
 
Methodology 
 This research will use a survey based methodology to address the research and 
investigative questions.  USAF weapon system program offices will be self-assessed 
using the SCRAM™ tool to identify vulnerabilities and capabilities within the individual 
weapon system’s supply chain.  The weapon systems will be organized into two groups 
based on their current position within the weapon system life cycle.  Phase I is identified 
as weapon systems from conception through production and Phase II is identified as 
weapon systems from post production through disposal.  Figure 3 depicts a basic view of 
the weapon system life cycle and its division into phases used for this research. 
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Concept 
Refinement 
Technology 
Development 
System 
Development 
& 
Demonstration 
Production 
& 
Deployment 
Operations & Support Disposal 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
      
          Phase I              Phase II 
 
Figure 3: Lifecycle Framework with Project Phases  
(Adapted from Defense Acquisition University, 2009) 
 
 
To answer the investigative questions the individual weapon system assessments 
will be analyzed by statistical methods to identify if the SCRAM™ tool will measure an 
overage and an underage of capabilities verses vulnerabilities.  Additionally, the 
complete set of weapon system assessments divided into the two phases (Phase I and 
Phase II) will be statistically compared to identify if differences exist between life cycle 
phases.  The intent of this research is to assist USAF leadership with supply chain 
management for weapon systems as they mature and progress throughout the weapon 
system life cycle.  Specifically to enable leadership to proactively identify and mitigate 
weapon systems risks for real-time business continuity and long-term sustainability. 
Scope and Limitations 
 Given the vast amount of weapon systems currently within the USAF’s weapon 
system life cycle, this research will be limited to addressing supply chain resilience of 
eleven weapon systems identified in conjunction with the researcher, principal 
investigator and sponsoring organization.  Due to the complexity of the weapon systems 
throughout the life cycle and the varying methods used to manage the individual weapon 
system supply chains, this may impose limitations on the generalizability of the results. 
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Summary 
 This section began with an introduction and background of military and USAF 
supply chain management progression.  Introduction of the AFGLSC followed with a 
discussion of its top focus areas to improve USAF supply chain management.  This paper 
is concentrated on improving AF supply chain processes, specifically supply chain risk 
management through resilience.  Additionally, the problem statement, the research 
objective, research focus with investigative questions, and methodology were presented 
to frame the research.  The organization of the rest of this paper is as follows.  Literature 
review is presented in Chapter II, followed by methodology in Chapter III.  Results and 
analysis of the research are discussed in Chapter IV.  The research concludes in Chapter 
V with managerial implications, research limitations, and future research 
recommendations. 
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II. Literature Review 
Introduction 
This chapter begins with a detailed explanation of the weapon system life cycle 
and the definition of supply chain, as used for this research.  The rest of the chapter 
discusses traditional risk management, resilience, why resilience is important, resilience 
framework and how to measure resilience.   
Weapon System Life Cycle  
 In Chapter I, Figure 3 displayed a simplified pictorial view of the weapon system 
life cycle. Figure 4, shows the complete Integrated Defense Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics Life Cycle Management System (Defense Acquisition University, 2009).  This 
image is intended for a 2’x3’ poster and in this size is added to emphasize the complexity 
of the system.  This system is structured by DoDI 5000.02 into discrete phases separated 
by major decision points, called milestones or decision reviews, with a number of key 
activities to provide the basis for comprehensive management and informed decision 
making.  Life Cycle Logistics (LCL) is included in this system as the planning, 
development, implementation, and management of a comprehensive, affordable, and 
effective systems support strategy within the total life cycle systems management.  LCL 
encompasses the entire weapon system’s life cycle including acquisition (design, 
develop, test, produce, and deploy), sustainment (operations and support), and disposal.  
A key goal or objective of USAF logistics is to maintain and improve readiness, improve 
affordability, and minimize the overall footprint of the weapon system and its required 
support (DoDI 5000.02).  As discussed in Chapter I, this research will separate the 
weapon system life cycle into two phases, Phase I and Phase II.  Phase I includes weapon 
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systems from conception through production and Phase II includes weapon systems from 
post production through disposal 
 
 
Figure 4: Integrated Defense Acquisition, Technology,  
and Logistics Life Cycle Management System  
(Defense Acquisition University, 2009) 
 
 
Definition of Supply Chain  
There are many different definitions of a supply chain in literature.  Stock and 
Boyer noted 173 individual definitions of supply chain management in journals and 
books (2009).  For the purpose of this research, the supply chain is defined as the network 
of organizations involved in the upstream and downstream flows of products, services, 
finances and information from the initial supplier to the ultimate customer (Christopher, 
1992; Mentzer et al., 2001; Lambert, Garcia-Dastugue, Croxton, 2005 and Pettit, 2008).  
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This definition is important to the research of resilience; it must have a wide view across 
the supply chain to capture the dynamics of turbulence and complexity (Pettit, 2008).  
Risk Management 
 Traditional risk management involves risk analysis which includes assessing each 
risk in terms of its likelihood of occurrence (probability), and the estimated impact 
(severity) should the risk occur (VanderBok, et. al, 2007).  A typical step by step 
explanation of the risk management process is shown Figure 5, illustrating a continuous 
circle of risk identifying, assessing, analyzing, controlling, implementing and reviewing 
(Manuele, 2005).  Today’s supply chains are much more complex and more susceptible 
to disruptions due to the globalized supply chains, specialized factories, centralized 
distribution, increased outsourcing, reduced supplier base, increased volatility of demand, 
and technological innovations (Cranfield University, 2002).  Recent literature identifies 
the greatest weakness of risk management is its inability to adequately characterize low-
probability, high-consequence events (Kunreuther, 2006).  Pettit noted that “traditional 
assessment approach cannot deal with unforeseeable events” (2008:16).   
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Figure 5: Operational Risk Management Process 
                   (Adapted from: Manuele, 2005) 
 
 
 
Resilience 
 What is resilience?  A respected dictionary defines resilience as “the tendency of 
a material to return to its original shape after the removal of a stress that has produced 
elastic strain” (Merriam-Webster, 2007:1340).  Resilience has been identified as an 
important concept in other fields of study, such as ecology, psychology, leadership, and 
the supply chain (Folke et al., 2004; Gorman et al., 2005; Stoltz, 2004; Rice and Caniato, 
2003; Sheffi, 2005; Christopher and Peck, 2004; Fiksel, 2006; and Ponomarov and 
Holcomb, 2009).  Definitions of resilience from the fields of study listed above are 
summarized in Table 1.  
 
Step 1:
Identify Hazards
Step 2:
Assess Risks
Step 3:
Analyze Controls
Step 4:
Determine Controls
Step 5:
Implement Controls
Step 6:
Supervise
and Review
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Table 1: Definitions of Resilience 
(Adapted from Pettit, 2008) 
Source Definition Field of study 
Merriam-
Webster 
(2007) 
Capability of a body to recover its size and shape after 
deformation Engineering 
Folke et al. 
(2004) 
Ability to rebound from a disturbance while maintaining diversity, 
integrity and ecological processes Ecology 
Gorman et al. 
(2005) Ability to bounce back from adversity Psychology 
Stoltz (2004) Ability to bounce back from adversity and move forward stronger than ever Leadership 
Rice and 
Caniato 
(2003) 
Ability to react to an unexpected disruption and restore normal 
operations Supply chain 
Sheffi (2005) Containment of disruption and recovery from it Supply chain 
Christopher 
and Peck 
(2004) 
Ability of a system to return to its original state or move to a new, 
more desirable state after being disturbed Supply chain 
Fiksel (2006) Capacity for complex industrial systems to survive, adapt and grow in the face of turbulent change Supply chain 
Ponomarov 
and Holcomb 
(2009) 
Capability to prepare for unexpected events, respond to 
disruptions, and recover by maintaining continuity of operations 
at the desired level of connectedness and control 
Supply chain 
 
Why Resilience? 
“Supply chain resilience no longer implies merely the ability to manage risk. It 
now assumes that the ability to manage risk means being better positioned than 
competitors to deal with–and even gain advantage from–disruptions” (Sheffi, 2005:1).  
Why the interest in supply chain resilience?  According to Christopher and Peck, “in an 
age of lengthening supply chains serving globe-spanning operations, there are frequent 
reminders that we live in an unpredictable and changing world 2004:1).  Fiksel added, 
“the old methods of risk management are no longer effective in a global economy that is 
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tightly connected and unpredictable” (The Ohio State University, 2008:1).  Fiksel also 
stated “companies must cope with a continuous stream of surprises, ranging from 
industrial accidents to economic shocks to natural catastrophes” and “resilience is about 
configuring company assets, including both human and economic capital, in a way that 
maximizes the capacity of the enterprise to survive, adapt and grow in the face of 
turbulent change” (The Ohio State University, 2008:1). 
 The study of supply chain resilience was spurred by the disruptions in the United 
Kingdom’s (UK) transportation network due to fuel protests in 2000 and to UK’s beef 
market due to the outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease in 2001 (Peck, 2005).  
Additionally, there are many examples of disruptions that demonstrate the importance of 
resilience.  For example, a lightning bolt that, in March 2000, struck a Philips 
semiconductor plant in Albuquerque, New Mexico, created a 10-minute blaze that 
contaminated millions of chips and subsequently delayed deliveries to its two largest 
customers: Finland’s Nokia and Sweden’s Ericsson.  The fire contributed to Ericsson to 
leaving the mobile phone business due to the losses it sustained, but Nokia prevailed 
because the company recognized the magnitude of the disruption and took action because 
it was resilient (Sheffi, 2005).  Also, the 2002 longshoreman union lockout at the Los 
Angeles/Long Beach port interrupted transshipments and deliveries to many US-based 
firms.  Port operations and schedules did not return to normal until six months after the 
strike ended.  This 10-day strike did not interrupt Dell Computer’s operations like it did 
for many of the other country’s retailers and manufacturers.  Dell was aware that its lean, 
high-speed business model left it vulnerable.  Dick Hunter, in charge of Dell’s United 
States supply chain, stated  “ when a labor problem or an earthquake or a SARS epidemic 
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breaks out, we’ve got to react quicker than anyone else” (Breen, 2004:86).  Dell 
recognized its vulnerabilities and took steps to make sure they, as a firm, are resilient. 
The following is an excerpt taken from Pettit’s research that provides another view why 
businesses and organizations should be interested in and pursuing resiliency. 
In a world of turbulent change, resilience is a key competency, since even 
the most carefully designed supply chain is susceptible to unforeseen 
factors. Businesses must be prepared to cope with a continuous stream of 
challenges, ranging from human errors to technological failures to 
natural disasters (Pettit, 2008:191) 
 
Pettit argues that the ability to manage the risk of uncertainty is a challenge and that 
businesses are always changing and change introduces risk, and this requires resilience 
(2008).  Sheffi stated, “Some organizations cope far better than others with both the 
prospect and the manifestation of unquantifiable risk.  They don’t have in common a 
secret formula or even many of the same processes for dealing with risk, but they share a 
critical trait: resilience” (2005:1). 
Resilience Framework 
 Since the UK’s fuel protests in 2000 and the many other major disruptions around 
the globe and in the U.S. there has been many who have investigated supply chain 
resilience to define its characteristics.  A review of extant literature identified 
vulnerabilities as one of the characteristics of supply chain resilience (Peck, 2005; Sheffi, 
2005b; Pettit, 2008; Ponomarov and Holcomb, 2009).  Pettit defined supply chain 
vulnerabilities as “fundamental factors that make an enterprise susceptible to disruptions” 
(2008:191).  Table 2 lists and defines the vulnerability factors that Pettit identified during 
his research and lists the sub-factors identified for each factor. 
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Table 2: Vulnerability Factors 
(Adapted from Pettit, Fiksel and Croxton, 2010) 
Vulnerability Factor Definition Sub-Factors 
Turbulence  
Environment characterized by frequent 
changes in external factors beyond your 
control 
Natural disasters, Geopolitical 
disruptions, Unpredictability of 
demand, Fluctuations in 
currencies and prices, 
Technology failures, Pandemic 
Deliberate threats  
Intentional attacks aimed at disrupting 
operations or causing human or financial 
harm 
Theft, Terrorism/sabotage, Labor 
disputes, Espionage, Special 
interest groups, Product liability 
External pressures  
Influences, not specifically targeting the 
firm, that create business constraints or 
barriers 
Competitive innovation, 
Social/Cultural change, 
Political/Regulatory change, 
Price pressures, Corporate 
responsibility, Environmental 
change 
Resource limits  Constraints on output based on availability of the factors of production 
Supplier, Production and 
Distribution capacity, Raw 
material and Utilities 
availability, Human resources 
Sensitivity  
Importance of carefully controlled 
conditions for product and process 
integrity 
Complexity, Product purity, 
Restricted materials, Fragility, 
Reliability of equipment, Safety 
hazards, Visibility to 
stakeholders, Symbolic profile of 
brand, Concentration of capacity 
Connectivity  Degree of interdependence and reliance on outside entities 
Scale of network, Reliance upon 
information, Degree of 
outsourcing, Import and Export 
channels, Reliance upon 
specialty sources 
Supplier/Customer 
disruptions 
Susceptibility of suppliers and customers 
to external forces or disruptions 
Supplier reliability, Customer 
disruptions 
 
 The vulnerability factors are discussed throughout the literature on the subject of 
supply chain resilience.  Many researchers identified vulnerabilities as the potential for 
disruptions.  Table 3 presents supply chain vulnerability taxonomy and matches it with a 
small sample from supply chain resilience literature. 
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Table 3: Supply Chain Resilience Framework – Vulnerabilities 
(Adapted from Pettit, Fiksel and Croxton, 2010) 
 
Main Factors of 
Vulnerability
Descriptors
Christopher
, Rutherford 
(2004)
Peck 
(2005)
Sheffi 
(2005)
Ponamarov, 
Holcomb 
(2009)
Pettit, 
Fiksel, 
Croxton 
(2010)
Turbulence Natural disasters X X X X X
Exposure to geopolitical disruptions X X X
Unpredictability of demand X X X
Fluctuations in currencies & prices X
Unforeseen technology failures X
Pandemic X
Deliberate threats Piracy & theft X X X X
Terrorism & sabotage X X X X
Labor disputes X X X
Industrial espionage X
Special interest groups X
Product liability X
External pressures Innovation (competition) X X
Social/Cultural changes X X
Political/Regulatory changes X X
Price pressures (competition) X
Corporate responsibility X
Environmental changes X
Resource limits Supplier capacity X
Production capacity X
Distribution capacity X
Raw material availability X
Utilit ies availability X
Human resources X
Sensitivity Complexity X X X X X
Product purity X
Restricted materials X
Fragility X
Reliability of equipment X X
Potential safety hazards X
Visibility of disruption to stakeholders X
Symbolic profile of brand X
Concentration of capacity X
Connectivity Scale/Extent of supply network X X X X
Reliance upon information flow X X X
Degree of outsourcing X X X X
Import/Export channels X
Reliance upon specialty sources X
Supplier/Customer 
disruptions
Supplier trust, loyalty, relations, 
reliability X X X X
Customer disruptions X
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The other characteristic that literature identified in supply chain resilience is 
capabilities (Cranfield, 2002; Fiksel, 2006, Peck, 2005; Sheffi, 2005; Pettit, Fiksel and 
Croxton, 2010; Ponomarov and Holcomb, 2009).  Pettit, Fiksel and Croxton defined 
supply chain capabilities as the “attributes that enable an enterprise to anticipate and 
overcome disruptions” (2010:191).  Table 4 lists and defines the capability factors 
identified and list the sub-factors identified (Pettit, Fiksel and Croxton, 2010). 
Table 4: Capability Factors 
(Adapted from Pettit, Fiksel and Croxton, 2010) 
 
Capability Factor Definition Sub-Factors 
Flexibility in 
sourcing  
Ability to quickly change inputs or 
the mode of receiving inputs 
Part commonality, Modular product design, Multiple 
uses, Supplier contract flexibility, Multiple sources 
Flexibility in order 
fulfillment  
Ability to quickly change outputs 
or the mode of delivering outputs 
Alternate distribution channels, Risk pooling/sharing, 
Multi-sourcing, Delayed commitment/Production 
postponement, Inventory management, Re-routing of 
requirements 
Capacity  Availability of assets to enable sustained production levels 
Reserve capacity, Redundancy, Backup energy sources 
and communications 
Efficiency  Capability to produce outputs with minimum resource requirements 
Waste elimination, Labor productivity, Asset utilization, 
Product variability reduction, Failure prevention 
Visibility  
Knowledge of the status of 
operating assets and the 
environment 
Business intelligence gathering, Information technology, 
Product, equipment and people visibility, Information 
exchange 
Adaptability  
Ability to modify operations in 
response to challenges or 
opportunities 
Fast re-routing of requirements, Lead time reduction, 
Strategic gaming and simulation, Seizing advantage from 
disruptions, Alternative technology development, 
Learning from experience 
Anticipation  Ability to discern potential future events or situations 
Monitoring early warning signals, Forecasting,  
Deviation and near-miss analysis, Risk management, 
Business continuity/preparedness planning, Recognition 
of opportunities 
Recovery  Ability to return to normal operational state rapidly 
Crisis management, Resource mobilization, 
Communications strategy, Consequence mitigation 
Dispersion  Broad distribution or decentralization of assets 
Distributed decision-making and Assets, Decentralization 
of key resources, Location-specific empowerment, 
Dispersion of markets 
Collaboration  Ability to work effectively with other entities for mutual benefit 
Collaborative forecasting, Customer management, 
Communications, Postponement of orders, Product life 
cycle management, Risk sharing with partners 
Organization Human resource structures, policies, skills and culture 
Accountability, Creative problem solving, Cross-training, 
Substitute leadership/empowerment, 
Learning/benchmarking, Culture of caring 
Market position Status of a company or its products in specific markets 
Product differentiation, Customer loyalty/retention 
Market share, Brand equity, Customer relationships, 
Customer communications 
Security Defense against deliberate intrusion or attack 
Layered defenses, Access restrictions, Employee 
involvement, Collaboration with governments, Cyber-
security, Personnel security 
Financial strength Capacity to absorb fluctuations in cash flow 
Insurance, Portfolio diversification, Financial reserves 
and liquidity, Price margin 
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Just as the vulnerability factors are discussed throughout the literature, 
capabilities have been investigated in literature within the subject of supply chain 
resilience.  Researchers have identified capabilities as management’s ability to anticipate 
and overcome disruptions (Pettit, Fiksel and Croxton, 2010).  Table 5 presents capability 
taxonomy and matches it with a small sample from supply chain resilience literature. 
Table 5: Supply Chain Resilience Framework — Capabilities 
(Adapted from Pettit, Fiksel and Croxton, 2010) 
Main 
Factors of 
Capability Descriptors 
Cranfield 
(2002, 
2003) 
Rice and 
Caniato 
(2003) 
Fiksel 
(2003) 
Peck 
(2005) 
Sheffi 
(2005) 
Ponomarov 
And 
Holcomb 
(2009) 
 
Pettit, 
Fiksel 
and 
Croxton 
(2010) 
Flexibility-
sourcing 
Commonality (facilities, 
processes)     X X X 
 
Product commonality 
(modularity, 
interchangeability) 
 X   X  X 
 Multiple uses for supplies  X   X  X 
 Supplier contract flexibility X X X X X  X 
 Multiple sources X X X X X  X 
Flexibility-
fulfillment 
Alternate distribution 
channels  X  X   X 
 Risk pooling/sharing     X X X 
 Multi-sourcing (peak vs. base)       X 
 Delayed commitment, Production postponement     X X X 
 Inventory management      X X 
 Fast re-routing of requirements       X 
Capacity Reserve capacity (materials, assets, labor, inventory) X X  X X X X 
 Redundancy (assets, labor) X X   X X X 
 Backup energy sources/communications     X X X 
Efficiency Waste elimination X  X  X  X 
 Labor productivity      X X 
 Asset utilization      X X 
 Product variability reduction       X 
 Failure prevention       X 
Visibility Business intelligence gathering X    X X X 
 Information technology X X  X  X X 
 Products, Assets, People visibility X X  X   X 
 Collaborative information exchange      X X 
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   Table 5 continued. 
Main 
Factors of 
Capability 
Descriptors Cranfield 
(2002, 
2003) 
Rice and 
Caniato 
(2003) 
Fiksel 
(2003) 
Peck 
(2005) 
Sheffi 
(2005) 
Ponomarov 
And 
Holcomb 
(2009) 
 
Pettit, 
Fiksel 
and 
Croxton 
(2010) 
Adaptability Fast re-routing of requirements  X   X X X 
 Process Improvement, Lead time reduction X X X X X X X 
 Strategic gaming & simulation   X X X  X 
 Seizing advantage from disruptions     X X X 
 Alternative technology development   X X   X 
 Learning from experience, Reengineering    X X X X 
Anticipation Monitoring early warning signals  X  X X X X 
 Forecasting X   X X  X 
 Deviation, Near-miss analysis    X X  X 
 
Contingency planning, 
Preparedness 
(Training/Drill/Exercise 
plans) 
 X   X  X 
 
X 
 Risk management, Business continuity planning X X X  X X X 
 Recognition of opportunities     X  X 
Recovery Crisis management X X   X  X 
 Resource mobilization       X 
 Communications strategy      X X 
 Consequence mitigation       X 
Dispersion Distributed decision-making    X  X  X 
 Distributed capacity & assets X X X  X  X 
 Decentralization of key resources (including data)   X  X  X 
 Location-specific empowerment       X 
 Geographic dispersion of markets       X 
Collaboration 
Collaborative forecasting, 
Customer relationship 
management 
X X X X X X X 
 Communications - internal, external X  X X X X X 
 Postponement of orders      X X 
 Product life cycle management       X 
 Risk sharing with partners      X X 
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Table 5 continued. 
Main 
Factors of 
Capability Descriptors 
Cranfield 
(2002, 
2003) 
Rice and 
Caniato 
(2003) 
Fiksel 
(2003) 
Peck 
(2005) 
Sheffi 
(2005) 
Ponomarov 
And 
Holcomb 
(2009) 
 
Pettit, 
Fiksel 
and 
Croxton 
(2010) 
Organization Learning, Benchmarking, Feedback  X     X 
 
Responsibility, 
Accountability & 
Empowerment 
X      X 
 Teamwork, Creative problem solving X    X X X 
 Training, Cross-train workers  X   X  X 
 Substitute leadership capacity       X 
 Culture of caring for employees       X 
Market 
position Product differentiation       X 
 Customer loyalty/retention       X 
 Market share       X 
 Brand equity       X 
 Customer relationships      X X 
 Customer communications      X X 
Security Layered defenses X *  X X  X 
 Access restriction X    X  X 
 Employee involvement in security     X  X 
 Collaboration with governments X   X X  X 
 Cyber-security     X  X 
 Personnel security       X 
Financial 
strength Insurance  X     X 
 Portfolio diversification   X    X 
 Financial reserves & liquidity   X    X 
 Price margin       X 
* NOTE: Authors specifically describe security as separate from resilience. 
  
How to Measure Resilience 
 Many scholars agree that supply chain resilience is essential in today’s global 
environment (Christopher and Peck, 2004; Sheffi, 2005; Ponomarov and Holcomb, 2009; 
Pettit, Fiksel, and Croxton 2010).  However, the ability to measure supply chain 
resilience without using traditional risk management techniques had been lacking in 
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literature.  Based on the framework that Pettit, Fiksel and Croxton developed, Pettit with 
the Center for Resilience and the Fisher College of Business at The Ohio State University 
created the Supply Chain Resilience Assessment and Management (SCRAM™) tool 
(Pettit, 2008). 
The resilience framework that Pettit, Fiksel and Croxton developed was based on 
two postulates and three propositions (2010). 
Postulate 1: Forces of change create supply chain vulnerabilities. 
Postulate 2: Management controls create supply chain capabilities. 
Proposition 1: Supply chain resilience increases as capabilities increase and 
vulnerabilities decrease 
 
Proposition 2: Linkages exist between each vulnerability and a specific set of 
capabilities that can directly improve balanced resilience. 
 
Proposition 3A: Excessive vulnerabilities relative to capabilities will result in 
excessive risk. 
 
Proposition 3B: Excessive capabilities relative to vulnerabilities will erode 
profitability. 
 
Proposition 3C: Supply chain performance improves when capabilities and 
vulnerabilities are more balanced. 
 
Pettit, Fiksel and Croxton built their resilience framework using tenets of 
Grounded Theroy (2010).  The first phase created the taxonomies of both capabilities and 
vulnerabilities based on extant literature and then refined and validated this list with 
supply chain managers from a large retailer with a complex global supply chain.  The 
second phase of the validation used focus groups from the large retailer using a detailed 
interview protocol to discuss recent supply chain disruptions in order to identify the 
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vulnerabilities and capabilities (Pettit, Fiksel and Croxton, 2010).  Figure 6 is a pictorial 
view of the Pettit’s framework. 
 
 
Figure 6: Supply Chain Resilience Framework 
 (Pettit, Fiksel and Croxton, 2010) 
  
Pettit, Fiksel and Croxton believed that through the measurement of 
vulnerabilities and capabilities they could provide an evaluation of a supply chain’s 
current level of resilience and from this developed the supply chain resilience assessment 
and management (SCRAM™) tool to direct supply chain improvements (2010).  The tool 
is designed to subjectively measure the vulnerability and capability factors and their 
respective sub-factors.  The target population for SCRAM™ included all business 
organizations, both for-profit and not-for-profit, global companies and privately owned 
small businesses, as well as corporations and governmental agencies (Pettit, 2008).  It is a 
web-based survey instrument that measures responses in ordinal form in a Likert Scale 
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“Disagree/Agree,” ranging from 1 to 5.  Due to the large number of factors and sub-
factors (21 and 111, respectively) Pettit controlled the number of questions in order to 
maintain a reasonable survey length (Dillman, 2000; Pettit 2008).   
Pettit, Fiksel and Croxton proposed that the assessment of the 21 factors, listed in 
Tables 2 and 4, respectively, can be used to evaluate an organization’s current state of 
resilience within its supply chain, and therefore, through a strategic review of the 
organization’s resilience suggest recommendations for improvements that can be 
prioritized to meet strategic goals.  The recommendations are designed to lead an 
organization to a state of “balanced resilience”.  Figure 7 graphically presents this state of 
“balanced resilience” and shows that an overage in capabilities relative to vulnerabilities 
erodes profits and the overage of vulnerabilities relative to capabilities exposes an 
organization to risk (Pettit, Fiksel and Croxton, 2010).  
 
 
Figure 7: Zone of Balanced Resilience (Pettit, 2008) 
 Pettit’s research indicated that the SCRAM™ tool is a viable method of 
evaluating the levels of vulnerabilities and capabilities of a firm’s supply chain.  
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Presentation of his results to corporate sponsors provided excellent feedback as to the 
breadth of the supply chain resilience framework and the ability of the SCRAM™ tool to 
accurately measure the sources of change facing the firm as well as the firm’s strengths 
and weaknesses (Pettit, 2008).   
Summary 
 The literature review provided an overview of the USAF weapon system life 
cycle, the definition of resilience used in this research, risk management processes, 
resilience, why resilience is important to organizations, resilience framework, and how to 
measure resilience.  Additionally, the results of Pettit’s research provide an opportunity 
for further research utilizing the SCRAM™ tool.  This research plans to validate the 
SCRAM™ tool on USAF weapon systems throughout the weapon system life cycle.  The 
following chapter covers the research methods that are intended to be used to complete 
this research paper. 
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III. Research Methodology 
Introduction 
 This research employs a web-based survey instrument to collect the data 
necessary to answer the research question and the three investigative questions.  This 
chapter begins by stating the research and investigative questions.  The chapter continues 
with the research assumptions and limitations, the selection of the weapon systems and 
their respective respondents, and the SCRAM™ tool with modifications necessary for a 
military application and the administration of the SCRAM™.  The chapter concludes 
with a discussion of the analysis plan followed by a summary. 
Research and Investigative Questions 
 To date, the SCRAM™ tool has not been utilized on a military supply chain.  
This indicates the opportunity for the following research question to be investigated:  
Research Question: Is the SCRAM™ tool able to measure supply chain 
vulnerabilities and capabilities within the USAF’s weapon 
system life cycle and provide useful feedback?  
 
To answer the research question the following investigative questions will be addressed: 
Question 1:  Will the SCRAM™ tool identify an overage of capabilities 
compared to vulnerabilities in selected weapon system at the 
current point in time in the weapon system life cycle? 
 
Question 2:  Will the SCRAM™ tool identify an underage of capabilities 
compared to vulnerabilities in selected weapon system at the 
current point in time in the weapon system life cycle? 
 
Question 3:  Do supply chain vulnerabilities and capabilities vary across the 
separate weapon system life cycle phases?  
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Assumptions and Limitations 
 The following assumptions are stated for this research: 
1. The weapon system samples participating in this research represent the 
population of weapon systems in the Air Force. 
 
2. The respondents are subject matter experts in their functional role. 
3. The respondents hold top-level positions within the organization, providing a 
strategic perspective. 
 
4. The respondents are knowledgeable with the supply chain their organization 
operates in regardless if organically or contactor managed. 
 
5. The respondents took the appropriate amount of time to read, understand and 
answer each question properly. 
 
6. That the weapon system life cycle phases (Phase I and Phase II) for this 
research do not overlap. 
 
The following are limitations of this research project: 
 
1. The sample size of this research may provide less than robust results. 
 
2. The weapon system’s leadership decision to select only one from each 
functional role may introduce single-respondent bias. 
 
3. Due to the complexity of the weapon systems throughout the life cycle and the 
varying methods used to manage the individual weapon system supply chains, 
this may impose limitations on the generalizability of the results. 
 
Research Sample 
 The target sample population for this study is USAF weapon system program 
offices that are actively managing weapon systems.  The type of weapon systems targeted 
included man and unmanned from the attack, bomber, cargo, fighter, multi-mission, 
special electronic installation, and tanker type of systems.  There were 21 weapon 
systems identified in a collaboration effort between the researcher, principal investigator 
and the research sponsoring organization.  A request letter (Appendix A) was distributed 
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to the leadership of the 21 different weapon systems.  Following the request letter, follow 
up contact was made and 11 weapons systems agreed to participate in the project, 
representing a 52% response rate.  
 Each weapon system’s leadership was asked to identify a cross-functional team of 
top-level personnel from their organization.  The cross-functional team should include, 
but not limited to, such functional roles as engineering, acquisition, sustainment, program 
management, research and development, logistics, financial management, and 
contracting.  Each team was to include a minimum of five members, with no maximum 
stated.  The minimum number of five participants was arbitrarily chosen to get a varied 
sample of top-level cross-functional participants.  The request for top-level cross-
functional participants was reiterated in all follow up contact, leaving the final selection 
of participants to the weapon system’s leadership.   Table 6, displays the number of each 
functional role represented per weapon system with the total number of participants for 
each weapon system and the overall total of all participants. 
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Table 6: Functional Roles by Weapon System 
 
 
 Additionally, each weapon system’s leadership was asked to provide a point of 
contact or a list of individuals for which the researcher would electronically send the 
survey link.  If the organization only provided a point of contact for the researcher to 
send the assessment link, the point of contact was asked to provide the number of 
respondents and functional roles of the assigned to take the assessment to assist the 
researcher in tracking the organization’s completion.   
 The SCRAM™ tool includes a total of 152 questions.  Each participant was 
informed, as a guide, the assessment will take on average approximately 30 minutes to 
complete.  Of the 54 participants, the longest time to complete the assessment was 87 
minutes and the shortest time to complete the assessment was approximately 4.5 minutes.  
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Respondents with low completion times, less than 15 minutes, may bring concern of the 
reliability of the data due to the number of questions.  All samples were kept with the 
assumption that the weapon systems leadership tasked their most qualified person(s) in 
that functional role.  Table 7 includes an average of assessment completion times of the 
participants by weapon system and the number of respondents in each of the functional 
role and the organization timeframe categories.  With 29 of the 54 (53%) respondents 
having more than 10 years of experience in their functional role lends credit to the 
assumption that the respondents are subject matter experts.  A note of interest is the 
number of respondents that have less than five years in their current organization.  Of the 
54 respondents 44 (81%) have less than five years. 
 
Table 7: Assessment Completion Times with Timeframe in Role and Organization 
 
 
 
 
 
Weapon 
System #
Min/Max 
completion 
time 
(min/max)
Average 
Completion 
time     
(mm:ss) 0- <1 Year 1-< 5 Years 5-10 Years
More than 
10 Years 0- <1 Year 1-< 5 Years 5-10 Years
More than 
10 Years
1 4:19/30:59 16:00 1 1 1 2 1 3 1
2 20:58/44:30 36:47 3 2 1 4
3 6:54/53:23 17:30 1 2 2 1 2 2
4 12:57/54:19 24:33 1 1 3 3 2
5 24:53/59:18 46:30 1 5 1 4 1
6 18:37/55:39 39:10 1 1 1 2 1
7 7:04/35:37 18:50 1 2 2 3 1 1
8 13:19/87:00 38:03 1 2 2 3 2
9 7:18/29:25 18:38 1 2 2 5
10 6:14/50:40 27:12 5 3 2
11 6:14/50:40 17:33 2 3 2 3
27:21
29 19 25 6 4
The number of Respondents                                         
Time in current Organization
The number of Respondents                                     
Time in current Functional Role
Total average time
Total # of respondents per time frame 5 13 7
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Supply Chain Assessment and Management (SCRAM™) tool  
As discussed in Chapter II, the SCRAM™ tool was developed by Pettit, in 
conjunction with the Center for Resilience and the Fisher College of Business at The 
Ohio State University (Pettit, 2008).  SCRAM™ is a web-based instrument that firms are 
administered to self-assess the supply chain their organization is operating within.  Web-
based or internet surveys are a low cost method compared to traditional research 
methods, such as telephone, mail, and fax surveys (Griffis, Goldsby and Cooper, 2003; 
Maronick, 2009).   The web-based instrument was appropriate for this research since all 
participants have access to the internet.  The survey instrument was reviewed and 
approved by Air Force Institute of Technology’s Institutional Review Board.   
The SCRAM™ tool in Pettit’s research has been improved with further research 
and this study will use the latest version of the tool, SCRAM™ 2.0.  In SCRAM™ 2.0 
the vulnerability factors have been reduced by one; therefore, there are only six.  The 
vulnerability factor removed was supply/customer disruptions.  In a personal interview, 
Pettit discussed the broadness of the supply/customer disruption factor and the reason for 
removing the factor from the vulnerability list.  His reasoning was that a firm’s strategic 
suppliers and customers would complete the SCRAM™ from their perspective and 
consolidated into a multi-aspect view of the supply chain’s resilience (Pettit, 2010b).  The 
SCRAM™ 2.0 vulnerability factors and the sub-factors are listed in Table 8. 
Furthermore, the capability factors have also been modified since Pettit’s initial 
research.  In Pettit’s (2008) study he identified 14 capabilities, but further research 
expanded this list to 16 factors.  The two capabilities factors that were added include; 
flexibility in manufacturing and product stewardship.  In a personal interview, Pettit 
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discussed the reasoning for expanding the list.  Flexibility in manufacturing was added as 
an individual factor from flexibility in order fulfillment due to scope of manufacturing 
complexities.  The second factor added was product stewardship due to the importance of 
sustainable business practices required by government regulations and the public’s desire 
for responsible firms protecting the environment (Pettit, 2010b).  Table 9 lists the 
SCRAM™ capability factors and sub-factors 
Table 8 SCRAM™ 2.0 Vulnerability Factors 
(Pettit, Fiksel, and Croxton, 2010) 
Vulnerability Factor Definition Sub-Factors 
Turbulence  
Environment characterized by frequent 
changes in external factors beyond 
your control 
Natural disasters, Geopolitical 
disruptions, Unpredictability of 
demand, Fluctuations in 
currencies and prices, Technology 
failures, Pandemic 
Deliberate threats  
Intentional attacks aimed at disrupting 
operations or causing human or 
financial harm 
Theft, Terrorism/sabotage, Labor 
disputes, Espionage, Special 
interest groups 
External pressures  
Influences, not specifically targeting 
the firm, that create business 
constraints or barriers 
Competitive innovation, 
Social/Cultural change, 
Political/Regulatory change, 
Budget constraints, Corporate 
responsibility, Environmental, 
Health and Safety Concern 
Resource limits  Constraints on output based on availability of the factors of production 
Supplier, Production and 
Distribution capacity, Raw 
material and Utilities availability, 
Human resources 
Sensitivity  
Importance of carefully controlled 
conditions for product and process 
integrity 
Complexity, Product purity, 
Restricted materials, Fragility, 
Reliability of equipment, Safety 
hazards, Visibility to stakeholders, 
Symbolic profile of brand, 
Concentration of capacity 
Connectivity  Degree of interdependence and reliance on outside entities 
Scale of network, Reliance upon 
information, Degree of 
outsourcing, Import and Export 
channels, Reliance upon specialty 
sources 
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Table 9: SCRAM™ 2.0 Capability Factors 
(Pettit, Fiksel, and Croxton, 2010) 
 
Capability Factor Definition Sub-Factors 
Flexibility in 
sourcing  
Ability to quickly change inputs or 
the mode of receiving inputs 
Part commonality, Multiple uses, Supplier 
contract flexibility, Multiple sources 
Flexibility in 
Manufacturing 
Ability to quickly and efficiently 
change the quantity and type of 
outputs 
Modular product design, Delayed 
commitment/ Production postponement, 
Small batch sizes, Equipment change over 
speed 
Flexibility in order 
fulfillment  
Ability to quickly change outputs 
or the mode of delivering outputs 
Alternate distribution channels, Risk 
pooling/sharing, Multi-sourcing, Inventory 
management, Re-routing of requirements 
Capacity  Availability of assets to enable sustained production levels 
Reserve capacity, Redundancy, Backup 
energy sources and communications 
Efficiency  Capability to produce outputs with minimum resource requirements 
Waste elimination, Labor productivity, 
Asset utilization, Product variability 
reduction, Failure prevention 
Visibility  
Knowledge of the status of 
operating assets and the 
environment 
Business intelligence gathering, Information 
technology, Product, equipment and people 
visibility, Information exchange 
Adaptability  
Ability to modify operations in 
response to challenges or 
opportunities 
Fast re-routing of requirements, Lead time 
reduction, Strategic gaming and simulation, 
Seizing advantage from disruptions, 
Alternative technology development, 
Learning from experience 
Anticipation  Ability to discern potential future events or situations 
Monitoring early warning signals, 
Forecasting,  
Deviation and near-miss analysis, Risk 
management, Business 
continuity/preparedness planning, 
Recognition of opportunities 
Recovery  Ability to return to normal operational state rapidly 
Crisis management, Resource mobilization, 
Communications strategy, Consequence 
mitigation 
Dispersion  Broad distribution or decentralization of assets 
Distributed decision-making and Assets, 
Decentralization of key resources, Location-
specific empowerment, Dispersion of 
markets 
Collaboration  Ability to work effectively with other entities for mutual benefit 
Collaborative forecasting, Customer 
management, Communications, 
Postponement of orders, Product life cycle 
management, Risk sharing with partners 
Organization Human resource structures, policies, skills and culture 
Accountability, Creative problem solving, 
Cross-training, Substitute 
leadership/empowerment, 
Learning/benchmarking, Culture of caring 
Market position Status of a company or its products in specific markets 
Product differentiation, Customer 
loyalty/retention 
Market share, Brand equity, Customer 
relationships, Customer communications 
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Table 9: Continued  
 
 
Pettit validated SCRAM™ by assessing seven commercial firms with global 
supply chains.  This validation occurred through a series of focus groups within each firm 
using a multiple case study methodology (Pettit, 2008; Yin, 2003).  Pettit administrated 
the SCRAM™ to the seven firms to evaluate several recent disruptions within each firm 
to validate the tool (Pettit, 2008).  Additionally, Pettit’s (2008) research included the 
methods he used to address construct validity, internal validity, external validity and 
reliability.   
Construct validity was controlled by using multiple respondents from each firms 
varying functional areas, a secure database back-up, and followed up by a final 
presentation to the firm’s leadership (Pettit, 2008).  Therefore, to ensure construct 
validity, Pettit used multiple data sources to combine expert perceptions with historical 
performance (2008).  
For internal validity, Pettit conducted a pre-test by academics and practitioners, 
and a large pilot test of the SCRAM™ tool prior to administering the assessment to his 
research sample (2008).  Additionally, he used Cronbach’s alpha as an unbiased estimator 
of internal consistency.  Pettit noted that in literature well-developed scales will have a 
Cronbach’s alpha of 0.7 or greater, but using a lower limit of 0.5 is acceptable in 
Security Defense against deliberate intrusion or attack 
Layered defenses, Access restrictions, 
Employee involvement, Collaboration with 
governments, Cyber-security, Personnel 
security 
Financial strength Capacity to absorb fluctuations in cash flow 
Insurance, Portfolio diversification, 
Financial reserves and liquidity, Price 
margin 
Product 
Stewardship 
Assurance of sustainable business 
practices throughout product life 
cycle 
Monitor environmental, health and safety, 
Communicate sustainability with Suppliers, 
Communicate disposal requirements with 
Customers  
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exploratory research (2008).  Table 10 compares Pettit’s Cronbach’s alpha scores of his 
main sample to the Cronbach’s alpha of this research’s population sample.  The 
difference between SCRAM™ 1.0, which Pettit used in his research, and SCRAM™ 2.0, 
which is used for this research are noted in Table 8.  The Cronbach’s alpha values are 
consistent except for a decrease in factors V3, V4, and C14, and an increase in factor C1.  
V3 – External pressures alpha of 0.487, fell below the 0.5 threshold that Pettit (2008) set 
for his exploratory study.  This may be explained by the sample size of the current study 
(N=54).  V4 – Resource limits alpha of 0.405 also fell below the 0.5 threshold.  Again the 
sample size may have an impact and the number of questions for this factor was reduced 
from six in Pettit’s study to three in this research. C14 – Financial Strength alpha dropped 
dramatically from 0.682 in Pettit’s study to 0.069 in this research.  This factor was 
reduced to two questions for the current research and the wording modified to match 
government terminology.  This alpha may be unacceptable and should be investigated in 
further studies.  C1 – Flexibility in sourcing experienced a significant increase in its 
Cronbach’s alpha.  Pettit’s original study recorded an alpha of 0.288 and the current 
research recorded an alpha of 0.719.  This may be attributed to the change from 
SCRAM™ 1.0 to SCRAM™ 2.0.  In SCRAM™ 2.0 an additional factor was created out 
of SCRAM™ 1.0 C1 and C2 factors, flexibility in manufacturing.  The purpose of this 
research was to use SCRAM™ 2.0 with minor changes to terminology and removal of 
any sub-factors that do not relate to the military’s supply chain management practices. 
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Table 10: Internal Reliability of Factor Measures 
(Adapted from Pettit, 2008) 
 
Baseline 
SCRAM™ 1.0 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7
Number of Items 6 6 6 6 9 5 2
Cronbach’s Alpha 
(Pettit, 2008)
0.651 0.756 0.746 0.730 0.704 0.745 0.756
Sample size* 138 134 142 105 102 130 142
Equivilent 
SCRAM™ 2.0 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 X
Number of Items 7 5 6 3 9 5 X
Cronbach’s Alpha 
(Current sample) 0.709 0.754 0.487 0.405 0.785 0.554 X
   Sample size* 54 48 53 49 53 52 X
Baseline 
SCRAM™ 1.0 C1 X C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7
Number of Items 5 X 6 3 5 4 6 6
Cronbach’s Alpha 
(Pettit, 2008) 0.288 X 0.677 0.515 0.701 0.813 0.708 0.803
Sample size* 75 X 90 96 108 123 91 99
Equivilent 
SCRAM™ 2.0 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8
Number of Items 5 9 6 5 6 8 5 10
Cronbach’s Alpha 
(Current sample) 0.719 0.645 0.719 0.601 0.848 0.856 0.872 0.934
   Sample size* 52 49 40 39 44 41 41 46
Baseline 
SCRAM™ 1.0 C8 C9 C10 C11 C12 C13 C14 X
Number of Items 4 5 5 6 6 6 4 X
Cronbach’s Alpha 
(Pettit, 2008)
0.682 0.461 0.615 0.779 0.763 0.896 0.682 X
Sample size* 136 115 89 158 141 87 136 X
Equivilent 
SCRAM™ 2.0 C9 C10 C11 C12 X C13 C14 C15
Number of Items 5 6 11 7 X 6 2 5
Cronbach’s Alpha 
(Current sample) 0.859 0.413 0.907 0.930 X 0.933 0.069 0.864
   Sample size* 44 46 47 40 X 35 46 39
X  Indicates the factor was not part of either Pettit's (2008) or the current research
* Sample size due to listwise deletion of missing or “Don’t Know” responses: Pettit's (2008) Sample N=170, Current               
Sample N=54.
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 To ensure external validity, Pettit designed into his study a sample of firms that 
are representative from the spectrum of markets (Pettit, 2008).  Furthermore, Pettit noted 
that the generalizability of the assessment tool was further improved because it was 
created using a broad set of extant literature and presented to eight focus groups within a 
firm that produces a wide variety of products (Pettit, 2008; Pettit, Fiksel and Croxton, 
2010).   
To ensure reliability, Pettit was the single researcher that facilitated each of the 
focus groups.  Pettit conducted a pre-test and pilot test for the assessment tool.  The early 
tests were used to correct interpretation issues related to the format and content of the 
assessment tool (Pettit, 2008).  Additionally, Pettit used hold-out samples for the case 
studies.  The hold-out sample was administered a subset of the questions in order to 
evaluate the reliability of the focus group’s ability to uncover salient points and his 
research concluded that the focus groups performed well in extracting the necessary 
salient points (Pettit, 2008).   
Current Research 
This research uses SCRAM™ 2.0 and assessed military organizations, 
specifically USAF weapon system acquisition and sustainment organizations that are 
managing weapon systems in one of the two different phases of the weapon system life 
cycle.  The weapon system life cycle is divided into two different phases, Phase I  
includes weapon systems from conception through production and Phase II includes 
weapon systems from post production through disposal.  Figure 8, depicts a description 
of weapon system life cycle framework and how the life cycle is divided into two phases 
for this research.  
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Figure 8: Lifecycle Framework with Project Phases  
(Adapted from Defense Acquisition University, 2009) 
 
The SCRAM™ tool required minor modification prior to assessing military units.  
First, the capability factor “market position” was removed from the assessment, it was 
determined that this capability was not appropriate for this assessment due to the military 
is not concerned with market share or brand equity.  Additionally, each individual 
question was reviewed and modified if the wording was not consistent with government 
terminology.  For example, the word product was replaced with the words weapon system 
throughout the tool.  Refer to Appendix B for the modified SCRAM™ 2.0 used for this 
research. 
Administration of SCRAM™ 
 The SCRAM™ tool was built onto Air Force Institute of Technology’s server 
utilizing Snap Survey software.  When participants completed the assessment their 
responses were collected in Air Force of Institute’s web survey-information retrieval 
system (WebSIRS), which is a database that is common access card secured and only the 
researcher could access. 
 All weapon system point of contacts or individual respondents were electronically 
sent an e-mail with a brief set of instructions and a hyperlink to access the SCRAM™ 
tool.   
39 
The instructions included with the assessment link are as follows: 
1. The assessment should take approximately 30 minutes to complete. 
2. Do not close the assessment prior to completion due to the server will not save the 
assessment if not fully completed. 
 
3. During the assessment you can use your browser’s back button to go back to 
questions/screens you have previously answered/viewed. 
 
4. This assessment of your weapon system is not a collaboration effort.  Only answer 
for your functional expertise.  If there are questions you do not have expertise in, 
use the “Don’t Know” answer button. 
 
5. Do not share the assessment link with others. 
 
Once the individual respondents accessed the assessment tool on-line, additional 
directions were provided.  See Appendix B, Modified SCRAM™ Assessment Tool, for 
the additional directions presented to the assessment respondents.   
 The initial e-mail with the assessment link was sent out on 12 December 2009.  
Weapon systems were given updates on the number of completed assessments beginning 
on 8 January 2010 and approximately every two weeks for a total of three e-mails with 
updates.  It was decided to only send three updates spread apart by two weeks to not bias 
the respondents.    
Analysis Method 
 The data collected from each weapon systems self-assessment from the 
SCRAM™ tool is used for the analysis of this research.  Two separate methods were 
used to answer each investigative question and the overall research question. 
To answer investigative questions 1 and 2, which are listed at the beginning of 
this chapter, the data collected from each individual weapon system was used to calculate 
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a small-sample confidence interval for the sample population mean (McClave, Benson 
and Sincich, 2008).  Due to the small sample size, three to six respondents, both 
parametric and nonparametric methods were explored.  The researcher decided for this 
set of investigative questions to use the parametric method, since 94% of all samples can 
be assumed to come from a normal distribution at the 95% confidence level according to 
the statistical program JMP8.  The nonparametric method was not an option due to the 
small sample size, the reference chart for the parametric method in Rice’s book should 
not be used below n=5 (Rice, 1995). 
To answer investigative question number 3, the weapon systems’ SCRAM™ 
results were grouped into the two phases, Phase I and Phase II.  Again, due to the small 
sample size, Phase I with a sample size of N=5 and Phase II with a sample size of N=6, 
both parametric and nonparametric statistical methods were explored.  The research opted 
to use the nonparametric method, Wilcoxon rank sum test, due to the results being more 
conservative than the parametric method. 
Summary 
This chapter discussed the laid the foundation for the research methodology. The 
chapter began with the research question and investigative questions, then a review of the 
research approach.  The next chapter will present the analysis of the data collected from 
the SCRAM™ assessment tool. 
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IV. Analysis and Results 
Introduction 
 This chapter will present the data and the results of the analysis used to answer 
the research question and investigative questions. 
Research and Investigative Questions 
Research Question: Is the SCRAM™ tool able to measure supply chain 
vulnerabilities and capabilities within the USAF’s weapon 
system life cycle and provide useful feedback?  
 
To answer the research question the following investigative questions will be addressed: 
Question 1:  Will the SCRAM™ tool identify an overage of capabilities 
compared to vulnerabilities in selected weapon system at the 
current point in time in the weapon system life cycle? 
 
Question 2:  Will the SCRAM™ tool identify an underage of capabilities 
compared to vulnerabilities in selected weapon system at the 
current point in time in the weapon system life cycle? 
 
Question 3:  Do supply chain vulnerabilities and capabilities vary across the 
separate weapon system life cycle phases? 
 
Weapon System Assessments 
 Each weapon system identified for this research the individual respondents were 
administered a SCRAM™ web-based assessment.  The results from the individual 
assessments were used to answer the investigative questions and the research question for 
this study.   
 The data from each respondent’s self-assessment using the SCRAM™ tool was 
analyzed using a Microsoft Excel program that Pettit (2008) developed.  The SCRAM™ 
analyzer calculates an aggregated resilience assessment score from the individual 
respondent’s subjective assessment of the organization’s supply chain.  Additionally, 
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resilience gaps, an imbalance of vulnerabilities verses capabilities, are calculated between 
linked vulnerabilities and capabilities (Pettit, 2008).  Figure 9 is the resilience assessment 
score for Phase I and Phase II weapon systems.  Table 11 and Table 12 are charts of 
Phase I and Phase II resilience gaps, respectively. 
 
Figure 9: Phase Comparison Resilience Assessment  
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Table 11: Phase I Resilience Gaps  
 
 
Table 12: Phase II Resilience Gaps  
 
Phase I
Turbulence
Deliberate 
Threats
External 
Pressures
Resource 
Limits Sensitivity Connectivity
V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6
Flexibility in Sourcing C1 -18.5% 0.7% -6.4% 12.4% 8.4%
Flexibility in Manufacturing C2 -11.6% -16.0% -0.9%
exibility in Order Fulfillment C3 5.6% 4.5%
Capacity C4 -10.0% -24.2% -0.2% 2.6% 3.5% -23.2%
Efficiency C5 -3.3% -8.6% 4.8% 12.5% -14.6%
Visibility C6 -4.9% 3.0% 21.8% -16.1%
Adaptability C7 1.7% 9.1% 2.8% 10.8% 2.4%
Anticipation C8 1.5% 4.0% 0.0% 6.9% 20.7% -2.9%
Recovery C9 10.6% 9.8% 1.2% 5.2% -0.3%
Dispersion C10 8.4% 15.3% 46.2% 1.4%
Collaboration C11 -0.1% 3.6% 19.5% -6.9%
Organization C12 6.3% 0.0% 27.8%
Security C13 -21.6% -30.0%
Financial Strength C14 9.6% -6.6% -4.7%
Product Stewardship C15 5.3% 4.4% 10.6% 12.0% 1.5%
* Upper gap limit 5%
* Lower gap limit -5%
Phase II
Turbulence
Deliberate 
Threats
External 
Pressures
Resource 
Limits Sensitivity Connectivity
V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6
Flexibility in Sourcing C1 -25.8% -3.5% -20.2% 6.0% 2.4%
Flexibility in Manufacturing C2 -15.5% -17.9% -2.0%
exibility in Order Fulfillment C3 1.0% -3.3%
Capacity C4 -12.8% -26.7% -4.8% -6.2% -0.5% -27.8%
Efficiency C5 -14.5% -20.0% -11.0% 0.7% -26.8%
Visibility C6 -7.1% 7.3% 16.3% -22.3%
Adaptability C7 -8.3% 3.3% 2.0% 1.0% -3.6%
Anticipation C8 -10.6% -8.9% -19.5% -8.3% 8.8% -16.9%
Recovery C9 0.7% -1.1% -12.9% -5.7% -11.0%
Dispersion C10 3.4% 11.0% 32.1% -3.3%
Collaboration C11 -10.5% -9.0% 10.0% -16.2%
Organization C12 -3.2% -12.0% 17.2%
Security C13 -21.9% -27.3%
Financial Strength C14 3.2% 0.6% -12.4%
Product Stewardship C15 -0.8% -4.9% 1.7% 3.2% -7.1%
* Upper gap limit 5%
* Lower gap limit -5%
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 Each weapon system that participated in this study the organization’s leadership 
was provided the results of their individual organization’s assessment with 
recommendations.  
Investigative Questions 1 and 2 
 The SCRAM™ tool was administered to 11 weapon systems with an average of 
five respondents per weapon system; see Table 6, in Chapter III, for a breakdown of 
respondents per weapon system.  To test for an overage/underage of capabilities 
compared to vulnerabilities each weapon system’s individual results were used to 
calculate a resilience score.  The resilience score (R) is calculated from each weapon 
system’s individual respondent’s assessment answers, using a Likert scale of 1 to 5, by a 
formula that uses an single vulnerability (V) score and calculates with each of the 
individual capability (C) score, C1 through C15.  For example, the result of the formula 
((4-V1+C1)/8-0.5) would equal the value of R1.1.  The R score for all respondents was 
then averaged to get the mean R score and standard deviation.  The critical t-statistic 
values were obtained from TABLE V in Appendix B of McClave, Benson and Sincich’s 
statistical book (2008).  Using the values stated above the confidence intervals were 
calculated using Microsoft Excel with average and standard deviation functions 
embedded in Excel and the formula    , where x-bar is the mean, t is the test 
statistic, s is the standard deviation, and n is the sample size.  Prior to calculating the 
confidence interval all R scores (R1.1 through R1.15 for each Vulnerability (1 through 
6)) the data was checked for a normal distribution in JMP 8. Of the 90 groups checked, 
94% with a 95% confidence level appeared to be from a normal distribution.  From this 
information it was determined to use the parametric small-sample confidence interval for 
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a population mean from McClave, Benson and Sincich’s book (2008).  Table 13 displays 
the results from weapon system #10’s V6 with the results from V1 through V6 in 
Appendix C.   
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Table 13: Confidence Interval for WS10; Vulnerability 6 
V6
Respondents R6.1 R6.2 R6.3 R6.4 R6.5 R6.6 R6.7 R6.8 R6.9 R6.10 R6.11 R6.12 R6.13 R6.14 R6.15
A 0.125 0.095833 0.16875 0.033333 0.075 0.1375 0.2 0.1375 -0.075 0.047222 -0.025 0.0125 -0.05 0.1375
B
C 0 -0.15833 -0.05417 -0.23125 -0.05417 -0.09286 -0.15833 -0.15 -0.0125 -0.075 -0.09063 -0.075 0.05 -0.075 -0.11667
D -0.11667 -0.15104 -0.04167 -0.16667 -0.04167 -0.07738 -0.06667 -0.04167 -0.11667 -0.16667 -0.06439 -0.04167 -0.02083 -0.04167 -0.04167
E 0.025 0 0.041667 0.025 0.041667 -0.09375 0.041667 -0.04167 0.125 -0.025 0.034091 0.089286 0.125 0 0.075
Mean 0.008333 -0.05339 0.028646 -0.0849 0.005208 -0.088 -0.01146 -0.00833 0.033333 -0.08542 -0.01843 -0.0131 0.041667 -0.04167 0.013542
Std Dev 0.099303 0.123379 0.102633 0.134364 0.063042 0.009204 0.128622 0.14798 0.120905 0.059073 0.069266 0.071349 0.062639 0.03118 0.114229
tα/2 2.353 2.353 2.353 2.353 2.353 2.92 2.353 2.353 2.353 2.353 2.353 2.353 2.353 2.353 2.353
Count 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Confidence Level(90.0%)
+ Conf. Interval 0.125163 0.09177 0.149393 0.073184 0.079377 -0.07248 0.139866 0.165765 0.175578 -0.01592 0.063065 0.070847 0.115361 -0.00498 0.147932
- Conf. Interval -0.1085 -0.19854 -0.0921 -0.24298 -0.06896 -0.10351 -0.16278 -0.18243 -0.10891 -0.15492 -0.09992 -0.09704 -0.03203 -0.07835 -0.12085
Overage of Capabilities 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Underage of Capabilities 0 0 0 0 0 1** 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
Balanced Resilience 27
Overage of Capability 0
Underage of Capability 2
** 99% Confidence Level
Resilience Score
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 The results from the small-sample confidence interval of weapon system #10’s 
SCRAM™ assessment results identified two positive resilience gaps, an overage of 
capabilities verses vulnerabilities, at a confidence level of 90%, with V1 - R1.14 at a 95% 
confidence level.  Additionally, as shown above in Table 13, three negative resilience 
gaps, an underage of capabilities verses vulnerabilities, are identified at a confidence 
level of 90%, with R6.6 at a 99% confidence level.  The low numbers of confidence 
intervals that do not include the resilience mean score of zero, five out of 90, may be 
attributed to many different variables.  For example, the small sample size, the weapon 
systems supply chain resilience may be balanced, or the subjective answers of the 
selected respondents. 
Investigative Question 3 
 The results of the SCRAM™ were next used to compare Phase I versus Phase II 
of the weapon system life cycle to answer Investigative question 3.  As stated in Chapter 
III, the researcher used a nonparametric method to compare the distributions of Phase I 
against Phase II to indicate differences in the phases as weapon systems mature from 
Phase I to Phase II in the life cycle.   The nonparametric method used was the Wilcoxon 
rank sum test.  This method does not specify the shape or type of probability distribution, 
but does require two conditions for a valid test (McClave, Benson and Sincich, 2008) 
1. The two samples are random and independent 
2. The two probability distributions from which the samples are drawn are 
continuous. 
 
The Wilcoxon rank sum test was calculated using two different methods, first the data 
was entered into JMP 8, statistical software program, and the results are presented in 
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Table 14.  The second method to calculate the Wilcoxon rank sum test used the formula 
in Rice’s (1995) Mathematical Statistics and Data Analysis book.  The results of this 
method are presented in Table 15.  The results of both methods are similar with the 
Wilcoxon rank sum test calculated by the method in Rice’s (1995:402) book being more 
conservative.  The test identified one of the six vulnerability factors varied between Phase 
I and Phase II at a confidence level of 90%, and six of the 15 capability factors varied 
between Phase I and Phase II also at a confidence level of 90%.  Table 16, identifies the 
factors and the direction of the change. 
 
Table 14: Wilcoxon rank sum test, JMP8 
V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6
2-Sample Test, 
Normal Approx. 0.0828 1.0000 0.0277 0.1207 0.2353 0.4642
1-Way Test, 
ChiSquare 0.0679 1.0000 0.0219 0.1003 0.2012 0.4102
Reject/Fail to 
Reject Reject Reject
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7
2-Sample Test, 
Normal Approx. 0.2353 0.0552 0.2353 0.4632 0.0225 0.2002 0.0225
1-Way Test, 
ChiSquare 0.2012 0.0446 0.2012 0.4092 0.0176 0.1699 0.0176
Reject/Fail to 
Reject Reject Reject Reject
C8 C9 C10 C11 C12 C13 C14 C15
2-Sample Test, 
Normal Approx. 0.0222 0.0358 0.4113 0.0358 0.4113 0.7837 0.1207 0.1709  
ChiSquare 
Approx. 0.0174 0.0285 0.3613 0.0285 0.3613 0.7144 0.1003 0.1441
Reject/Fail to 
Reject Reject Reject Reject
Null Hyp: Phase I = Phase II
Alt Hyp: Phase I ≠ Phase II
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Table 15: Wilcoxon rank sum test (Rice, 1995) 
 
V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 C10 C11 C12 C13 C14 C15
W/S &  Phase
5                 1 2.74 2.90 3.50 3.39 3.83 3.93 3.10 2.88 3.57 3.44 3.82 3.83 3.51 3.67 3.92 3.82 3.75 3.79 3.70 3.42 4.03
6                 1       2.48 3.07 3.17 2.89 3.74 3.27 3.00 2.96 3.17 2.64 2.72 2.63 3.05 3.24 3.80 3.67 3.27 2.89 4.17 4.00 3.83
8                 1 2.44 3.50 3.50 3.00 4.49 4.13 1.94 2.29 2.50 2.63 2.74 3.27 2.55 2.73 3.50 3.83 2.88 2.84 4.17 2.13 3.72
10               1  3.11 3.28 3.29 2.79 3.38 3.58 3.30 2.98 3.50 2.91 3.25 3.16 3.47 3.51 3.43 3.10 3.52 3.64 3.63 3.25 3.53
11               1  2.95 3.25 3.68 3.07 3.67 3.42 3.64 2.99 3.51 2.55 3.42 3.14 3.29 3.33 3.45 2.96 3.31 3.30 3.79 3.18 3.42
1                 2 3.38 3.28 3.68 3.93 3.76 3.87 3.13 2.85 3.78 2.67 2.56 3.00 2.78 2.92 3.73 2.75 3.28 3.50 4.00 2.25 3.81
2                 2  2.59 2.70 3.63 3.57 3.77 4.02 2.24 2.28 3.01 2.08 2.93 2.70 2.66 2.58 3.08 3.71 2.80 2.88 3.60 2.60 3.32
3                 2 2.90 3.60 3.70 3.27 4.40 3.56 2.64 2.76 2.93 2.67 2.65 2.95 2.50 2.97 2.64 2.98 2.86 3.03 4.38 2.70 3.89
4                 2 3.28 3.25 3.87 3.75 4.04 4.04 2.48 2.73 2.38 2.63 2.14 2.63 2.54 2.18 2.25 3.44 2.25 2.24 3.25 2.67 3.12
7                 2 3.37 2.80 3.69 3.92 3.92 3.93 2.30 2.12 2.49 2.50 2.50 2.87 2.35 2.58 2.98 3.54 2.94 3.07 4.25 3.00 3.37
9                 2 3.18 3.40 3.59 2.67 3.93 3.75 2.92 2.64 3.03 2.71 2.16 3.22 2.07 2.36 2.81 3.58 2.66 3.08 3.22 2.30 3.08
R 20.00 30.00 17.50 21.00 23.00 25.50 37.00 41.00 37.00 34.50 43.00 37.50 43.00 43.00 42.00 35.00 42.00 35.00 32.00 39.00 38.00
R' 40 30 42.5 39 37 34.5 23 19 23 25.5 17 22.5 17 17 18 25 18 25 28 21 22
R* 20.00 30.00 17.50 21.00 23.00 25.50 23.00 19.00 23.00 25.50 17.00 22.50 17.00 17.00 18.00 25.00 18.00 25.00 28.00 21.00 22.00
α= 0.10 Reject Reject Reject Reject Reject Reject Reject
Critical Value of Smaller Rank Sum for the Wilcoxon Test is 20 (N1-5 and N2-6 for two-tailed  test at .10)
Null Hyp: Phase I = Phase II
Alt Hyp: Phase I ≠ Phase II
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Table 16: Difference between Phases 
 
 
Summary 
 The data collected from the SCRAM™ 2.0 assessment of 11 weapon systems was 
presented.  The following chapter, Chapter V, will present the conclusions formulated for 
answering the investigative questions and the overall research question.  The researcher 
will also present conclusions inferred from the results.  Furthermore, managerial 
implications and future research recommendations are also presented. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Factor Factor Factor
V1 C1 C8
V2 C2 C9
V3 C3 C10
V4 C4 C11
V5 C5 C12
V6 C6 C13
C7 C14
C15
Indicates no significant difference
Decreased
Decreased
Decreased
Phase I to Phase II Phase I to Phase II Phase I to Phase II
Increased
Decreased
Decreased
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations 
Introduction 
 Previous research presented opportunities for improvement with the Air Force’s 
supply chain management processes.  This research investigated literature in the field of 
supply chain resilience and identified the Supply Chain Resilience Assessment and 
Management (SCRAM™) tool as an avenue for potential improvement with Air Force 
supply chain risk management processes.  Based on the results of this study’s SCRAM™ 
assessment of 11 weapon systems within the two defined phases of the weapon system 
life cycle, the researcher provides an answer to the overall research question (Is the 
SCRAM™ tool able to measure supply chain vulnerabilities and capabilities within the 
USAF’s weapon system life cycle and provide useful feedback?).  Following the answer 
to the research question, the chapter continues with managerial implications, lessons 
learned, and areas of future research. 
Research Question 
 The information from Chapters II-IV provided the basis for answering the three 
investigative questions and the overall research question.  The researcher interpreted from 
the analysis and results that the SCRAM™ demonstrated the ability to measure 
vulnerabilities and capabilities within the defined weapon system life cycle phases and 
the information obtained can provide beneficial information to guide those that manage 
Air Force weapon systems as their weapon system matures and progress throughout the 
life cycle.  Though, these results are not without limitations, the results show promise for 
the utility of supply chain resilience to enhance current Air Force risk management 
processes.  
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Managerial Implications 
 The SCRAM™ tool assessment results have show in previous research that the 
assessment tool can identify an organization’s current level of resilience by measuring the 
organization’s supply chain vulnerabilities and capabilities (Pettit, 2008).  The results 
from this research obtained the same conclusions.  Additionally, the analysis and results 
in Chapter IV demonstrate that the SCRAM™ tool can target an imbalance of specific 
vulnerabilities and capabilities.  This information can provide weapon system leadership 
the ability to further investigate and apply corrective measures if deemed appropriate. 
 The results from comparing the defined phases of the weapon system life cycle 
produced promising results that there are changes in vulnerabilities and capabilities as 
weapon systems progress throughout the weapon system life cycle.  This information can 
be very beneficial to weapon system managers in providing the necessary information for 
strategic decisions as they plan for the next 5, 10, 15, 20 years and beyond.  Furthermore, 
since the AFGLSC is the organization responsible for the Air Force’s supply chain.  This 
information may be beneficial for instituting policy on supply chain management. 
Future Research 
 The researcher tried to be as thorough as possible in this study, but realizes that 
there are many opportunities for improvement and future research.  A more targeted 
study of one or two weapon systems with a larger sample size would be beneficial to the 
research of supply chain resilience within the USAF’s weapon system life cycle.  
Additionally, this researcher believes the research could be expanded by dividing the 
weapon system life cycle into more distinct phases to identify more differences as 
weapon systems mature through the life cycle.  This research only focused on the weapon 
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system’s supply chain resilience from the perspective of personnel in that weapon 
system.  Future research could explore the supply chain from not only the weapon system 
perspective, but also the suppliers and customers up and down the supply chain.  
Furthermore, the opportunity to conduct cost analysis studies of supply chain resilience 
would be beneficial to assist with future implementation within the USAF weapon system 
life cycle.  
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Appendix A: Assessment Support Request Letter 
 
 
Note: Distribution list not included in this document 
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Appendix B: Modified SCRAM™ 2.0 
 
 
56 
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Appendix C: Confidence Interval for Weapon System #10; V1-V6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
V1
Resondents R1.1 R1.2 R1.3 R1.4 R1.5 R1.6 R1.7 R1.8 R1.9 R1.10 R1.11 R1.12 R1.13 R1.14 R1.15
A 0.216667 0.1875 0.260417 0.125 0.166667 0.229167 0.291667 0.229167 0.016667 0.138889 0.066667 0.104167 0.041667 0.229167
B 0.15 0.025 -0.01667 0.025 0.025 0.05625 0.0625 -0.125 0.025 0.025 -0.02857 0.05625 0.025 0.025
C -0.05 -0.20833 -0.10417 -0.28125 -0.10417 -0.14286 -0.20833 -0.2 -0.0625 -0.125 -0.14063 -0.125 0 -0.125 -0.16667
D 0.067857 0.033482 0.142857 0.017857 0.142857 0.107143 0.117857 0.142857 0.067857 0.017857 0.12013 0.142857 0.16369 0.142857 0.142857
E 0.096429 0.071429 0.113095 0.096429 0.113095 -0.02232 0.113095 0.029762 0.196429 0.046429 0.105519 0.160714 0.196429 0.071429 0.146429
Mean 0.09619 0.021815 0.079107 -0.01049 0.06869 -0.00826 0.061607 0.065357 0.06119 -0.00381 0.049783 0.043333 0.104107 0.03119 0.075357
Std Dev 0.099479 0.144073 0.142174 0.186104 0.110522 0.104464 0.163392 0.179521 0.155335 0.068793 0.114961 0.12014 0.079376 0.098275 0.153603
tα/2 2.132 2.132 2.132 2.353 2.132 2.353 2.132 2.132 2.132 2.132 2.132 2.132 2.132 2.132 2.132
Count 5 5 5 4 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Confidence Level(90.0%)
+ Conf. Interval 0.19104 0.159183 0.214665 0.20846 0.174069 0.114643 0.217395 0.236524 0.209296 0.061781 0.159394 0.157882 0.179789 0.124892 0.221812
- Conf. Interval 0.001341 -0.11555 -0.05645 -0.22944 -0.03669 -0.13116 -0.09418 -0.10581 -0.08692 -0.0694 -0.05983 -0.07121 0.028426 -0.06251 -0.0711
Overage of Capabilities 1* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Underage of Capabilities 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Balanced Resilience 28
Overage of Capability 2
Underage of Capability 0
Resilience Score
* 95% Confidence Level
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V2
Respondents R2.1 R2.2 R2.3 R2.4 R2.5 R2.6 R2.7 R2.8 R2.9 R2.10 R2.11 R2.12 R2.13 R2.14 R2.15
A 0.125 0.095833 0.16875 0.033333 0.075 0.1375 0.2 0.1375 -0.075 0.047222 -0.025 0.0125 -0.05 0.1375
B 0.275 0.15 0.108333 0.15 0.15 0.18125 0.1875 0 0.15 0.15 0.096429 0.18125 0.15 0.15
C -0.1 -0.25833 -0.15417 -0.33125 -0.15417 -0.19286 -0.25833 -0.25 -0.1125 -0.175 -0.19063 -0.175 -0.05 -0.175 -0.21667
D -0.0125 -0.04688 0.0625 -0.0625 0.0625 0.026786 0.0375 0.0625 -0.0125 -0.0625 0.039773 0.0625 0.083333 0.0625 0.0625
E 0.15 0.125 0.166667 0.15 0.166667 0.03125 0.166667 0.083333 0.25 0.1 0.159091 0.214286 0.25 0.125 0.2
Mean 0.0875 0.013125 0.070417 -0.0526 0.06 0.003795 0.052917 0.056667 0.0525 -0.0125 0.041092 0.034643 0.095417 0.0225 0.066667
Std Dev 0.146309 0.169839 0.133109 0.205081 0.128039 0.142981 0.182809 0.181969 0.141808 0.134048 0.140994 0.145235 0.121892 0.134745 0.165857
tα/2 2.132 2.132 2.132 2.353 2.132 2.353 2.132 2.132 2.132 2.132 2.132 2.132 2.132 2.132 2.132
Count 5 5 5 4 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Confidence Level(90.0%)
+ Conf. Interval 0.226999 0.17506 0.19733 0.188674 0.18208 0.172011 0.227218 0.230167 0.187708 0.115309 0.175524 0.173118 0.211636 0.150974 0.224805
- Conf. Interval -0.052 -0.14881 -0.0565 -0.29388 -0.06208 -0.16442 -0.12138 -0.11683 -0.08271 -0.14031 -0.09334 -0.10383 -0.0208 -0.10597 -0.09147
Overage of Capabilities 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Underage of Capabilities 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Balanced Resilience 30
Overage of Capability 0
Underage of Capability 0
Resilience Score
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V3
Respondents R3.1 R3.2 R3.3 R3.4 R3.5 R3.6 R3.7 R3.8 R3.9 R3.10 R3.11 R3.12 R3.13 R3.14 R3.15
A 0.008333 -0.02083 0.052083 -0.08333 -0.04167 0.020833 0.083333 0.020833 -0.19167 -0.06944 -0.14167 -0.10417 -0.16667 0.020833
B 0.145833 0.020833 -0.02083 0.020833 0.020833 0.052083 0.058333 -0.12917 0.020833 0.020833 -0.03274 0.052083 0.020833 0.020833
C -0.175 -0.33333 -0.22917 -0.40625 -0.22917 -0.26786 -0.33333 -0.325 -0.1875 -0.25 -0.26563 -0.25 -0.125 -0.25 -0.29167
D 0.05 0.015625 0.125 0 0.125 0.089286 0.1 0.125 0.05 0 0.102273 0.125 0.145833 0.125 0.125
E 0.108333 0.083333 0.125 0.108333 0.125 -0.01042 0.125 0.041667 0.208333 0.058333 0.117424 0.172619 0.208333 0.083333 0.158333
Mean 0.0275 -0.04688 0.010417 -0.09531 -2.2E-17 -0.04204 -0.00708 -0.00333 -0.0075 -0.0725 -0.01891 -0.02536 0.035417 -0.0375 0.006667
Std Dev 0.124917 0.164455 0.146945 0.221647 0.146575 0.156197 0.186837 0.182536 0.156442 0.138557 0.156743 0.177376 0.147975 0.16298 0.177771
tα/2 2.132 2.132 2.132 2.353 2.132 2.353 2.132 2.132 2.132 2.132 2.132 2.132 2.132 2.132 2.132
Count 5 5 5 4 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Confidence Level(90.0%)
+ Conf. Interval 0.146603 0.109926 0.150523 0.165455 0.139754 0.141728 0.171058 0.170707 0.141661 0.059608 0.130541 0.143763 0.176505 0.117895 0.176164
- Conf. Interval -0.0916 -0.20368 -0.12969 -0.35608 -0.13975 -0.2258 -0.18522 -0.17737 -0.15666 -0.20461 -0.16836 -0.19448 -0.10567 -0.19289 -0.16283
Overage of Capabilities 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Underage of Capabilities 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Balanced Resilience 30
Overage of Capability 0
Underage of Capability 0
Resilience Score
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V4
Respondents R4.1 R4.2 R4.3 R4.4 R4.5 R4.6 R4.7 R4.8 R4.9 R4.10 R4.11 R4.12 R4.13 R4.14 R4.15
A -0.075 -0.10417 -0.03125 -0.16667 -0.125 -0.0625 0 -0.0625 -0.275 -0.15278 -0.225 -0.1875 -0.25 -0.0625
B 0.166667 0.041667 0 0.041667 0.041667 0.072917 0.079167 -0.10833 0.041667 0.041667 -0.0119 0.072917 0.041667 0.041667
C 0.075 -0.08333 0.020833 -0.15625 0.020833 -0.01786 -0.08333 -0.075 0.0625 0 -0.01563 0 0.125 0 -0.04167
D 0.133333 0.098958 0.208333 0.083333 0.208333 0.172619 0.183333 0.208333 0.133333 0.083333 0.185606 0.208333 0.229167 0.208333 0.208333
E 0.066667 0.041667 0.083333 0.066667 0.083333 -0.05208 0.083333 0 0.166667 0.016667 0.075758 0.130952 0.166667 0.041667 0.116667
Mean 0.073333 -0.00104 0.05625 -0.04323 0.045833 0.036086 0.03875 0.0425 0.038333 -0.02667 0.026926 0.020476 0.08125 0.008333 0.0525
Std Dev 0.092684 0.088112 0.094786 0.136755 0.120041 0.098921 0.110923 0.107545 0.120163 0.142327 0.124384 0.165243 0.160768 0.165097 0.112485
tα/2 2.132 2.132 2.132 2.353 2.132 2.353 2.132 2.132 2.132 2.132 2.132 2.132 2.132 2.132 2.132
Count 5 5 5 4 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Confidence Level(90.0%)
+ Conf. Interval 0.161704 0.082969 0.146625 0.117663 0.160287 0.152467 0.14451 0.14504 0.152904 0.109036 0.14552 0.178029 0.234536 0.165746 0.159749
- Conf. Interval -0.01504 -0.08505 -0.03412 -0.20412 -0.06862 -0.08029 -0.06701 -0.06004 -0.07624 -0.16237 -0.09167 -0.13708 -0.07204 -0.14908 -0.05475
Overage of Capabilities 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Underage of Capabilities 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Balanced Resilience 30
Overage of Capability 0
Underage of Capability 0
Resilience Score
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V5
Respondents R5.1 R5.2 R5.3 R5.4 R5.5 R5.6 R5.7 R5.8 R5.9 R5.10 R5.11 R5.12 R5.13 R5.14 R5.15
A -0.03929 -0.06845 0.004464 -0.13095 -0.08929 -0.02679 0.035714 -0.02679 -0.23929 -0.11706 -0.18929 -0.15179 -0.21429 -0.02679
B 0.25 0.125 0.083333 0.125 0.125 0.15625 0.1625 -0.025 0.125 0.125 0.071429 0.15625 0.125 0.125
C -0.10556 -0.26389 -0.15972 -0.33681 -0.15972 -0.19841 -0.26389 -0.25556 -0.11806 -0.18056 -0.19618 -0.18056 -0.05556 -0.18056 -0.22222
D -0.02813 -0.0625 0.046875 -0.07813 0.046875 0.011161 0.021875 0.046875 -0.02813 -0.07813 0.024148 0.046875 0.067708 0.046875 0.046875
E 0.011111 -0.01389 0.027778 0.011111 0.027778 -0.10764 0.027778 -0.05556 0.111111 -0.03889 0.020202 0.075397 0.111111 -0.01389 0.061111
Mean 0.017629 -0.05675 0.000546 -0.13369 -0.00987 -0.04247 -0.01695 -0.0132 -0.01737 -0.08237 -0.02878 -0.03523 0.025546 -0.04737 -0.0032
Std Dev 0.136515 0.139595 0.094131 0.147556 0.113567 0.140816 0.153771 0.156047 0.082018 0.140689 0.127147 0.137121 0.126695 0.146043 0.133796
tα/2 2.132 2.132 2.132 2.353 2.132 2.353 2.132 2.132 2.132 2.132 2.132 2.132 2.132 2.132 2.132
Count 5 5 5 4 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Confidence Level(90.0%)
+ Conf. Interval 0.147791 0.076352 0.090296 0.039907 0.09841 0.123197 0.12966 0.13558 0.060829 0.05177 0.092451 0.095511 0.146344 0.091875 0.124365
- Conf. Interval -0.11253 -0.18984 -0.0892 -0.30729 -0.11815 -0.20814 -0.16357 -0.16199 -0.09557 -0.21651 -0.15001 -0.16597 -0.09525 -0.18662 -0.13077
Overage of Capabilities 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Underage of Capabilities 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Balanced Resilience 30
Overage of Capability 0
Underage of Capability 0
Resilience Score
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V6
Respondents R6.1 R6.2 R6.3 R6.4 R6.5 R6.6 R6.7 R6.8 R6.9 R6.10 R6.11 R6.12 R6.13 R6.14 R6.15
A 0.125 0.095833 0.16875 0.033333 0.075 0.1375 0.2 0.1375 -0.075 0.047222 -0.025 0.0125 -0.05 0.1375
B
C 0 -0.15833 -0.05417 -0.23125 -0.05417 -0.09286 -0.15833 -0.15 -0.0125 -0.075 -0.09063 -0.075 0.05 -0.075 -0.11667
D -0.11667 -0.15104 -0.04167 -0.16667 -0.04167 -0.07738 -0.06667 -0.04167 -0.11667 -0.16667 -0.06439 -0.04167 -0.02083 -0.04167 -0.04167
E 0.025 0 0.041667 0.025 0.041667 -0.09375 0.041667 -0.04167 0.125 -0.025 0.034091 0.089286 0.125 0 0.075
Mean 0.008333 -0.05339 0.028646 -0.0849 0.005208 -0.088 -0.01146 -0.00833 0.033333 -0.08542 -0.01843 -0.0131 0.041667 -0.04167 0.013542
Std Dev 0.099303 0.123379 0.102633 0.134364 0.063042 0.009204 0.128622 0.14798 0.120905 0.059073 0.069266 0.071349 0.062639 0.03118 0.114229
tα/2 2.353 2.353 2.353 2.353 2.353 2.92 2.353 2.353 2.353 2.353 2.353 2.353 2.353 2.353 2.353
Count 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Confidence Level(90.0%)
+ Conf. Interval 0.125163 0.09177 0.149393 0.073184 0.079377 -0.07248 0.139866 0.165765 0.175578 -0.01592 0.063065 0.070847 0.115361 -0.00498 0.147932
- Conf. Interval -0.1085 -0.19854 -0.0921 -0.24298 -0.06896 -0.10351 -0.16278 -0.18243 -0.10891 -0.15492 -0.09992 -0.09704 -0.03203 -0.07835 -0.12085
Overage of Capabilities 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Underage of Capabilities 0 0 0 0 0 1** 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
Balanced Resilience 27
Overage of Capability 0
Underage of Capability 2
** 99% Confidence Level
Resilience Score
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Supply Chain Resilience 
 
 Supply chains throughout the world have become very complex and the USAF is 
no exception.  The USAF’s supply chain is one of the largest and most complex supply 
chains in the world.  Due to the complexity of supply chains, organizations cannot rely on 
traditional risk management processes to protect them from unforeseen events.  Supply 
chains must become more resilient.  Supply chain resilience is defined many different 
ways.  One definition from The Ohio State University’s Center for Resilience is the 
capacity of a system to survive, adapt, and grow in the face of unforeseen changes, even 
catastrophic incidents.   
In 2003, the Department of Defense (DoD) directed the implementation of 
modern supply chain practices for all DoD components with the release of DoD 4140.1-
R, Supply Chain Material Management Regulation.  Under this guidance, the Air Force 
created the Global Logistics Support Center (AFLGSC), which is responsible for 
improving supply chain processes within the Air Force.   A collaboration effort between 
Air Force Institute of Technology and the AFGLSC enabled the research of supply chain 
resilience as a potential enhancement to Air Force traditional risk management processes.  
Through literature, a supply chain resilience framework and measurement tool 
was identified to determine potential benefit to current Air Force supply chain 
management processes.  Individual Air Force weapon system acquisition and sustainment 
programs were identified and segmented into two distinct phases of the weapon system 
86 
life cycle.  The phases included; Phase I – concept through production, and Phase II – 
post production through disposal.   This research analyzed data from individual weapon 
system program office self-assessments to compare the two phases, Phase I and Phase II.  
The self-assessments measured supply chain resilience in two factors, vulnerabilities and 
capabilities.  In this research, vulnerabilities are defined as fundamental factors that make 
an enterprise susceptible to disruptions and capabilities are defined as attributes that 
enable an enterprise to anticipate and overcome disruptions.   
The results of the study indicate that the supply chain resilience framework and 
measurement tool provides leadership with beneficial information to improve and assist 
in the management of their specific weapon system’s supply chain, as well as, providing 
insight into changes required as weapon systems mature in the life cycle.  First, the 
individual weapon system assessments provide leadership with an overall resilience score 
identifying vulnerabilities and capabilities in their supply chain.  Once identified, 
corrective action required to achieve a balanced resilience can be taken.  For example, an 
overage in vulnerabilities requires more attention to capabilities to reduce risk.  However, 
an overage in capabilities provides managers an opportunity for resource reduction or 
moving resources to other high risk areas.  Furthermore, the second benefit is the 
identification of measurable differences in the results of the Phase I and Phase II 
comparison.  This information allows Air Force leadership to proactively manage risk by 
providing insight to specific supply chain vulnerabilities and capabilities between the 
different life cycle phases.  This information assists Air Force leadership with strategic 
planning of weapon systems as they mature and progress through the life cycle. 
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